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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
a power to invade the corpus as "necessary for support" does not
enlarge an interest from a life estate to one in fee.15 The interest of
the widow was therefore not "indefeasibly vested," and the exemp-
tion afforded by the Tax Law was inapplicable.
The holding in the present case appears to be limited to a life
estate with a power of invasion as necessary for support. Since the
question was not considered, it may still be argued that a life estate
coupled with a power of invasion containing no such phrase is in-
defeasibly vested within the meaning of the tax statute.'0 It may
well be, however, that the phrase "as necessary for support" was
immaterial to the decision, and that the Court of Appeals based its
holding on the theory that the testamentary disposition of a life es-
tate, in and of itself, is sufficient to warrant a disallowance of the
tax 'exemption.
It would appear from judicial interpretation of this statute that
nothing less than the equivalent of a fee interest would be entitled to
tax exemption. An attempted application of so strict a standard to
each individual member of the family, however, seems inconsonant
with the original intention of the legislature.' 7
TORTS-IMPUTATION OF COMMUNISM NOT SLANDER PER SE.-
Defendant, in the presence of third parties, called plaintiff a com-
munist.' Plaintiff commenced this slander action, without alleging
special damages. Defendant's motion to dismiss was granted. Held:
An imputation of communism is not slander per se.2 The court then
reasoned that, in view of the cold war, it is better "... to allow free
15 See Matter of Close,' 281 App. Div. 147, 118 N. Y. S. 2d 284 (3d Dep't
1952).
16 It is therefore unnecessary to conclude either that Matter of Wilken,
supra note 13, is overruled, or that Matter of Ingrahain, supra note 14, is
approved.
17 See Matter of Weinberger, 194 Misc. 294, 297, 85 N. Y. S. 2d 11, 14
(Surr. Ct. 1948) (each transferee must qualify separately for the exemption,
not as a group) ; Matter of Stubblefield, 191 Misc. 823, 827-28, 79 N. Y. S.
3d 630, 633 (Surr. Ct. 1948) ; Matter of Walsh, 189 Misc. 350, 351, 71 N. Y. S.
2d 778, 779-80 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
1 The other defamatory statements were: "The whole neighborhood knows
that you and your husband (meaning Mary Keefe and David Keefe) are
communists." "Some investigator came to my house recently and I gave him
the whole story about your being communists."
2 The court recognized the established rule that an imputation of com-
munism, when written, would be libel per se, but adhered to the ancient dis-
tinction between libel and slander, citing with approval Ostrowe v. Lee, 256
N. Y. 36, 175 N. E. 505 (1931).
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play of our emotions . . ." in dealing with possible communists than
to silence people with the threat of costly litigation which would re-
sult if the use of the word "communist" were slander per se. Keefe
v. O'Brien, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
It was recognized early in the common law that imputations of
objectionable political or sociological principles were defamatory,3 and
actionable on the theory of libel or slander.4  Although American
courts have generally followed the common law,5 the term "objec-
tionable political or sociological principles" is an inherently relative
one, depending upon the prevailing sentiment of society at various
periods in history, which in turn is dictated by the political structure
of the country and the state of its international relations. 6
It requires little citation to express the present public attitude
towards communists, their affiliates and sympathizers.7 Though use
of the term was held not libelous in 1940,8 public sentiment has so
intensified that the brand of "communist" on a person today places
him ". . . beyond the pale of respectibility and make [s] him a symbol
of public hatred." 9 The courts have kept pace with this evolution of
sentiment, with the result that today it is libel per se to brand any
person a communist, or communist sympathizer. 10 This rule, transi-
a "Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name,
by communication to others which tends to diminish the esteem in which the
plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse feelings or opinions against him." PROSSER,
TORTS 777 (1941); accord, RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 559 (1938).
4 How v. Prin, Holt 652, 90 Eng. Rep. 1260 (1701); Lewis v. Coke,
Cro. Jac. 424, 79 Eng. Rep. 362 (1617); Charter v. Peter, Cro. Eliz. 602, 78
Eng. Rep. 844 (1597); Stapleton v. Frier, Cro. Eliz. 251, 78 Eng. Rep. 506
(1591); Waldegrave v. Agas, Cro. Eliz. 191, 78 Eng. Rep. 447 (1589).
5 See Skrocki v. Stahl, 14 Cal. App. 1, 110 Pac. 957 (1910); Wilkes v.
Shields, 62 Minn. 426, 64 N. W. 921 (1895); Wells v. Times Printing Co.,
77 Wash. 171, 137 Pac. 457 (1913).
6 Thus imputations of Pro-Nazi or Pro-German sympathies during the
periods of hostilities in both world wars have been held libelous per se. See
Browder v. Cook, 59 F. Supp. 225 (D. Idaho 1944) ; O'Donnell v. Philadelphia
Record Co., 356 Pa. 307, 51 A. 2d 775 (1947) ; Goodrich v. Reporter Pub. Co.,
199 S. V. 2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). Similar statements made prior to
hostilities would probably not be given that effect. Cf. Luotto v. Field, 49
N. Y. S. 2d 785, 788 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 268 App. Div. 227, 50 N. Y. S. 2d
849 (2d Dep't 1944), reVd, 294 N. Y. 460, 63 N. E. 2d 58 (1945).
7 See Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F. 2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U. S. 797 (1946) (the difference is solely one of degree as
between these three classifications).
s Garriga v. Richfield, 174 Misc. 315, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
But cf. Hays v. American Defense Soc'y, 252 N. Y. 266, 169 N. E. 380 (1929).
The Garriga decision has been justifiably criticized for failing to recognize the
true basis for liability, i.e., the public sentiment toward the Communist Party,
and the resultant injury to the plaintiff's reputation. See 24 NoTeRE DAME LAW.
542 (1949). Nevertheless, substantially the same reasoning as in the Garriga
decision was applied in McAndrews v. Scranton Republican Pub. Co., 364 Pa.
504, 72 A. 2d 780 (1950).
9 Ward v. League for Justice, 93 N. E. 2d 723, 726 (Ohio App. 1950).
1o See Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F. 2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947) (libel per se to
1953]
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tory though it may be, now seems well established; 1 but where the
imputation of communism is orally expressed it is not slander per se
unless directed at the plaintiff in his business or profession.12
This anomalous situation results from an adherence to the his-
torical distinction between the companion torts of libel and slander.'3
The primary basis for the distinction at common law was the realiza-
tion that the spoken word was heard by few, was often uttered in
anger or under provocation, was inclined to exaggeration, and theo-
retically, soon forgotten. A written accusation, on the other hand,
followed premeditation and was a permanent recordation which could
be circulated and read, preventing forgetfulness and indicating a mali-
cious intent.14 Except in certain instances, therefore, oral defamation
was not actionable without proving special damages, for none would
be presumed. 15
Notwithstanding the unexpected advent of new methods of com-
munication, the distinction has been maintained to the present day,
brand anyone a communist or a communist sympathizer, regardless of profes-
sional injury, because of public hatred, ridicule and aversion).
1" See Burrel v. Moran, 82 N. E. 2d 334 (Ohio C. P. 1948). The court in
Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N. Y. 94, 102, 75 N. E. 2d 257, 260 (1947), took a
negative view, asserting ". . . we may not say that the imputation of com-
munism is as a matter of law not libelous . .. ."
12 Cf. Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166, 171 (S. D. N. Y. 1949)
(court concluded that an imputation of communism would injure plaintiff, a
government economist, in his professional capacity); see 50 COL. L. Rlv. 526
(1950). But see Krumholz v. Raffer, 195 Misc. 788, 91 N. Y. S. 2d 743 (Sup.
Ct. 1949), where defendant called the manager of a labor union a "dirty low-
down Communist." The complaint was dismissed for failure to allege special
damages, since the court thought he had not been accused of a crime, and it
could not be said as a matter of law that he had been injured in his profession.
23 For an interesting historical development of the law of defamation and
the bases for the distinction between libel and slander, see PROSSER, TORTS 777
et seq. (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 568, comment b (1938).
14 See SEELMAw, THE LAw OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 1 et seq. (1933). Judge
Cardozo, approving of the distinction in Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N. Y. 36, 39, 175
N. E. 505, 506 (1931), declared: "The schism in the law of defamation be-
tween the older wrong of slander and the newer one of libel is not the product
of mere accident . . . . It has its genesis in evils which the years have not
erased. Many things that are defamatory may be said with impunity through
the medium of speech. Not so. however, when speech is caught upon the wing
and transmitted into print. What gives the sting to the writing is its per-
manence of form. The spoken word dissolves, but the written one abides and
'perpetuates the scandal.'" See also 34 MARQ. L. REv. 31 (1950); Donnelly,
The Law of Defamation: Proposals for Reform, 33 MINN. L. REV. 609, 610
(1949).
15 Slander is actionable without proof of special damage where the imputa-
tion (1) charges one with the commission of a crime involving moral turpi-
tude, (2) charges one with having a loathsome disease, (3) affects one in his
business, trade or profession, or (4) imputes unchastity to a woman. PROSSER,
TORTS 798 et seq. (1941) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 570-74 (1938) ; SEELMAN,
op. cit. siztra note 14, at 599 et seq.
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though frequently subjected to severe criticism.16 In some instances
the courts have noticeably struggled with the distinction. Thus def-
amation through the agency of talking motion pictures is libel, 17
while defamation over radio is slander when spoken extemporane-
ously,'8 and libel when read from a script, regardless of whether or
not the writing itself is ever seen by others.' 9 This arbitrary distinc-
tion has been applied more recently where the defamation is circulated
via the newer medium of television. 20
Although it was formerly true that libel was capable of wider
circulation than slander,21 it is obviously not true today, especially
in the fields of radio and television. An anomalous situation arises
under an application of the common-law rule in other areas, as, for
example, where an imputation of communism written on a postcard
and read by a single third person is actionable per se, whereas there
is no per se liability if the same thing be said before a large audience.
Similarly, there may be a recovery for a single line in a local news-
paper, but not for an extemporaneous imputation on a coast to coast
television broadcast. Though a writing evinces greater malice, the
intent to defame is not the basis of liability.22  The emphasis properly
belongs on the damage to plaintiff's reputation, which may be the same
whether the defamation is oral or written.
With a view toward correcting present inequities, several pro-
posals for the integration of libel and slander have been advanced,
16 See PRossME, TORTS 808 et seq. (1941) ; Toelle, The Law of Defamation
-Suggestions for Reform, 9 MONT. L. Rav. 17, 21 (1948).
37 Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50 Times L. R.
581, 99 A. L. R. 864 (1934). "There can be no doubt that, so far as the photo-
graphic part of the exhibition is concerned, that is a permanent matter to be
seen by the eye, and is the proper subject of an action for libel, if defamatory.
I regard the speech which is synchronized with the photographic reproduction
and forms part of one complex, common exhibition as an ancillary circum-
stance, part of the surroundings explaining that which is to be seen." Id., 99
A. L. R. at 875 (concurring opinion by Lord Justice Slesser) ; accord, Brown
v. Paramount Publix Corp., 240 App. Div. 520, 270 N. Y. Supp. 544 (3d Dep't
1934); Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152
N. Y. Supp. 829 (1st Dep't 1915).
18 Cf. Locke v. Benton & Bowles, Inc., 253 App. Div. 369, 2 N. Y. S. 2d
150 (1st Dep't 1938) ; Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N. Y. Supp. 188
(Sup. Ct. 1937); Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 316 Pa.
182, 8 A. 2d 302 (1939).
29 Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N. Y. 296, 73 N. E. 2d 30 (1947); cf.
Hryhorijiv (Grigorieff) v. Winchell, 180 Misc. 574, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 31 (Sup.
Ct. 1943); see Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, 85 (1932).
But see Note, 3 OrLA. L. REv. 446, 447 (1950).
20 See Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S. D. N. Y. 1949); 21 Miss.
L. J. 422 (1950); 25 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 416 (1950); 12 Omo ST. L. 3.
144 (1951); 36 VA. L. REv. 402 (1950).
22 See SEEL5AN, THE LAW oF LIm AND SLANDER 2 (1933).
22 See PRossn, TORTs 816 (1941).
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some of which have been adopted. 23 Perhaps a combination of sev-
eral of these proposals would afford a more realistic basis for liability
than now exists. Rather than differentiating between oral and written
defamation, it would seem more reasonable to consider the extent of
publication, possibly also distinguishing between major and minor
defamatory imputations, with only the former actionable per se. The
emphasis would thus be placed where it properly belongs: on the
greater potentiality for injury to reputation rather than on the form
of the defamation.
Though the result in the instant case can be justified on decisional
precedents following the traditional distinction between libel and
slander,24 the reasons advanced for the decision are open to serious
criticism. The law of defamation has for its object the protection of
the person defamed, not the defamer. The "free play of our emo-
tions" and, indeed, our constitutional freedom of speech have always
been limited by the laws of libel and slander. No sound reason is
apparent for a relaxation of this limitation when the imputation con-
cerns an alleged communistic tendency.
The practical effect of this stigma is to deny the communist or
communist sympathizer governmental 25 and private employment,26 or
even, in some instances, to result in his deportation.27 Since few
other imputations can have such a disastrous effect upon a person,
the defamer should be compelled to know whereof he speaks, and be
held strictly accountable when he speaks falsely.
23 See Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Proposals for Reform, 33 MINN.
L. R.v. 609, 611 (1949).24 See Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N. Y. 36, 175 N. E. 505 (1931).
25 Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fmn. REG. 1935 (1947). "The standard for the
refusal of employment . . . in an executive department . . . shall be that . . .
reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the
Government of the United States.
"Activities and associations . . . which may be considered in connection
with the determination of disloyalty may include ....
'C
"f. Membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with any
organization, association, movement, group . . . designated by the Attorney
General as ... communist ... ." See N. Y. EDUCATIoN LAw § 3022 (Feinberg
Law 1949) (teachers affiliated with subversive groups are to be discharged).26 Major radio and television advertising agencies, as well as the movie
industry receive lists of actual or suspected communists and communist sympa-
thizers, to be used as a guide in the employment of entertainers. The Taft-
Hartley Act requires the officers of every labor union to submit a loyalty oath
before any controversy may be presented to the National Labor Relations Board.
61 STAT. 146, 29 U. S. C. § 159(h) (Supp. 1947).
2766 STAT. 204 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. §1251(a)(6) (Supp. 1952).
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